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JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN
The Executioners Sing
n the United States, the jury sys-
tem is becoming a matter of contro-
versy. Most Americans still support
the basic concept of the jury trial, es-
pecially in criminal cases, believing
juries composed of average citizens to be an
important bulwark against the potential tyranny
of government. At the same time, widely publi-
cized cases like the Menendez case, the Hattori
case, the two Rodney King trials, and now the
O.J. Simpson case, have led many Americans
to question whether juries can be trusted to
make wise decisions. Emotional arguments by
lawyers, pressures from the mass media and
personal disagreements within the jury room
often seem to distort jury decision making.
Unfortunately, much of the debate about the
jury system has taken place in the dark, be-
cause juries conduct their business in a "black
box." No one else is allowed in the jury room
during deliberations. More than 30 years ago,
the Chicago Jury Project, headed by Harry
Kalven, Jr., and Hans Zeisel, tried to observe
juries by using hidden cameras and micro-
phones. This part of their research was quick-
ly banned, however, and ever since, re-
searchers have been unable to study jury be-
havior by direct observation.
In the absence of direct observation, jury re-
search has relied largely on either "mock jury"
studies (using volunteers, often, who pretend
to be jurors in a real or imaginary case) or in-
ferences about jury behavior from the end re-
sults of actual cases. These methods have pro-
duced important knowledge about juries, pro-
viding an empirical foundation for the theoret-
ical work of Phoebe Ellsworth, Shari Seidman
Diamond, Valerie Hans, Reid Hastie, Nancy
Pennington, Vicki Smith and other leaders in
jury research. Yet these methods often seem to
be missing a crucial connection with the "real
world" of jury decision-making. Jury re-
searchers have lacked the opportunity to learn,
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as Kalven and Zeisel tried to do, what really
happens in the jury room.
The Capital Jury Project is an attempt to fill
this research gap in the specific context of
death-penalty trials. Death-penalty trials are
certainly the most important cases that a jury
is ever asked to decide -- they involve, quite
literally, a matter of life and death. I will begin
by explaining some of the basic procedures of
an American-death penalty trial. Then I will
describe the Capital Jury Project and its
methodology. Finally, I will report some of the
interim findings of the Capital Jury Project.
American Death-Penalty Cases
There are both similarities and differences
in the basic procedures that are used in an av-
erage American criminal trial and in the trial
of a death-penalty case. One important differ-
ence is in the selection of the jury. In an aver-
age criminal trial, jury selection involves iden-
tifying any potential jurors who might have pri-
or knowledge about the case, or who might
have a relationship with one of the parties; of-
ten, it takes only a few minutes to select a jury.
In a death-penalty trial, on the other hand,
any person whose personal views about capi-
tal punishment are strong enough to substan-
tially influence his or her behavior as a juror is
excluded from service. In other words, each
potential juror must be capable of giving fair
and full consideration to both a life sentence
and a death sentence. This legal standard cre-
ates an opportunity for the lawyers to battle
over each potential juror, based on their feel-
ings about whether the potential juror is likely
to favor one sentence over the other. For this
reason, jury selection in a death-penalty case
often takes several weeks; during that period,
potential jurors are probed for their views
about capital punishment, before they have
even begun to hear any evidence about
whether the defendant committed the crime.
After the jury is finally selected, the next
part of an American death-penalty trial --
which is called the "guilt phase"of the trial --
proceeds much like any other criminal trial.
The prosecution presents its case first, fol-
lowed by any evidence that the defense wish-
es to present. The defense need not present
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any evidence at all; the prosecution must al-
ways bear the burden of convincing the jury,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
is guilty of the crime. The defendant need not
take the stand as a witness, and no inference
of guilt may be based on the defendant's si-
lence in the courtroom. The trial judge is a
largely passive observer of the proceedings,
ruling on procedural matters but otherwise let-
ting the jury make up its own mind based on
the evidence and the arguments of the
lawyers. After the close of evidence and argu-
ments, the jury receives instructions from the
judge and then retires to the jury room to de-
liberate, in private, about the defendant's guilt.
In the average criminal trial, if the defen-
dant is found guilty, then the jury's role is
over. The trial judge reads the jury's verdict
aloud in open court, the jury is dismissed, and
the case is scheduled for a sentencing hearing
at a future date. The trial judge then deter-
mines an appropriate sentence for the defen-
dant (within the range set by the statute) after
receiving information about the defendant's
background and circumstances.
In a death-penalty case, however, the guilt
phase of the trial is only a prelude to the main
event. In most instances, a prosecutor will not
ask for the death penalty unless the evidence
of the defendant's guilt is quite strong. There-
fore in a death-penalty case, it is often a fore-
gone conclusion that the defendant will be
found guilty by the jury.
After the guilt phase of a capital trial, the
trial reconvenes for what is called the "sen-
tencing phase." This phase is basically a sepa-
rate trial, except that the same parties, the
same trial judge, and (in most states) the same
jury are still involved. At the guilt phase of the
trial, the jury is told to focus only on whether
or not the the defendant committed the crime.
At the sentencing phase, the defendant's guilt
is no longer the issue; the only question is
whether or not the defendant should receive
the death penalty. In all but two of the states
where the death penalty exists, the same jury
that decided the defendant's guilt must go
ahead and try to reach a verdict (either final or
advisory, depending on the state) about
whether the defendant should live or die.
Although the guilt phase and the sentencing
phase of a capital trial may seem to be similar
in their basic procedures, they are quite differ-
ent in substance. The most important differ-
ence is in the role of the jury. In the guilt
phase (as well as in an average criminal trial),
the jury's role is to be the finder of fact. The
jury decides who is telling the truth, and what
really happened. There is (at least in theory) a
true story about what happened, and maybe
one or more false stories. It is the jury's fun-
damental role to determine the truth.
At the sentencing phase of a capital trial, on
the other hand, the jury is no longer deciding a
question that has a true or false answer. In-
stead, the jury is being asked to decide a
moral question that has no true or false an-
swer- is the defendant a person who deserves
to live or to die?
This is not a question of fact, but one of
moral judgment. There are no rules for mak-
ing this kind of decision, and the law gives the
jury no definitive guidance. The prosecution
presents its evidence in support of a death sen-
tence, usually emphasizing the brutality of the
defendant's crime; and the defense presents its
case for mitigation, usually trying to explain
how the defendant came to be the kind of per-
son he is. The trial judge instructs the jurors
about the factors to consider, but in the end,
the jury is told to exercise its sound discretion
and do whatever it believes to be just. If the
jury unanimously votes for a death sentence,
then (in most states) the trial judge must im-
pose such a sentence. A judge's power to
override the jury's sentencing verdict is (in
most states) extremely limited.
The Capital Jury Project
In 1990, a group of researchers from over a
dozen different American universities in the
widespread fields of law, sociology, political
science, psychology, and criminology came
together to begin a research project to inter-
view jurors who had served in death-penalty
cases. The Capital Jury Project is being fund-
ed by the National Science Foundation of the
U.S. Government. We are now near the end of
our data collection, and we will soon have
completed over one thousand juror interviews.
The Project is underway in more than a
dozen states, representing more than one third
of the states where the death penalty exists.
The states were chosen in order to permit use-
ful comparisons based on different kinds of
death-penalty statutes, as well as regional and
demographic variations. Within each state, our
sample includes all recent cases in which a ju-
ry was asked to decide whether or not to im-
pose a death sentence; half of our interviews
come from cases in which the jury voted for
life, and half come from cases in which death
was imposed. We interviewed at least three ju-
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rors in each case.
The interviews, which are all based on the
same data collection instrument and protocol,
cover the entire experience of the juror, from
the jury selection phase through the juror's
emotional reactions after the trial ended. The
interviews are audiotaped, and range in length
from two to eight hours. The interview data is
being entered into a computer for quantitative
analysis, and the audiotapes are providing rich
material for qualitative analysis.
Interim Findings
As an original member of the Capital Jury
Project, with responsibility for the Project in
my home state of Indiana, I am glad to have
this chance to report some of the Project's in-
terim findings. The quantitative findings I will
report are based on the completed sets of juror
interviews from seven states; I will also refer
to qualitative information from juror inter-
views in other states, where data collection is
still ongoing.
My report will focus on two areas of inter-
est. First, what specific factors exert the great-
est influence on jurors as they try to decide
whether the defendant should live or die? Sec-
ond, how do jurors feel about the responsibil-
ity they bear for the fate of the defendant, and
how do those feelings affect their behavior?
Factors That Influence the
Sentencing Decision
Perhaps the most important question that
we hope to explore is the question of what
specific factors most strongly influence the ju-
ry's sentencing decision. Because the jury is
not given a rigid legal formula for the deci-
sion, but is free to exercise discretion, we are
curious about the factors that determine
whether a defendant lives or dies. We hope
eventually to develop tentative models of jury
decision-making in capital cases, which may
also help us understand jury decision-making
in other kinds of cases.
So far, several observations can be made
about this subject. The most extensive analy-
sis has been conducted by Theodore Eisen-
berg of Cornell University, who supervised
the juror interviews in South Carolina. and his
research colleague Martin Wells. They found
that one of the most important issues for ju-
rors -- more important than such factors as the
defendant's criminal history, background and
upbringing, and remorse -- is whether the de-
fendant, if he is allowed to live, is likely to
pose a danger to society in the future. Most
states provide for either life imprisonment or a
very long term of years in prison (for exam-
ple, 50 years) as the alternative to a death sen-
tence. In many states, however, the jury is not
told about the nature of these alternative sen-
tences. Therefore, the impact of the factor of
"future dangerousness" depends on what ju-
rors believe -- rightly or wrongly -- about the
likelihood that a defendant who is not sen-
tenced to death will remain in prison for a
long time.
Over 60 percent of the jurors we inter-
viewed reported discussing this factor "a great
deal" or "a fair amount" -- even during the
guilt phase deliberations, at a time when they
were not supposed to be thinking about the
defendant's sentence at all. Nearly 65 percent
also reported discussing their feelings about
the right punishment during the same guilt
phase deliberations.
Under the law of almost all states, a jury is
never required to impose a death sentence on
a defendant; the trial judge instructs the jury
that the proper sentence in a capital case is al-
ways a matter of jury discretion. Yet 31.9 per-
cent of the jurors we interviewed said that,
based on their understanding of the judge's in-
structions, the law "required" a death sentence
if the defendant would be "dangerous in the
future."
More than three out of four jurors did find
that the defendant would be "dangerous in the
future." This figure may reflect the tendency
of jurors to underestimate how many years a
defendant will serve in prison if not given a
death sentence. Jurors who underestimate the
severity of alternative sentences and worry
about the defendant's "future dangerousness"
tend to vote for death.
Similar results have also been found by our
researchers in California and Florida; however
one out of three California jurors knew that a
defendant not sentenced to death would re-
ceive an alternative of life without parole. In
South Carolina, less than 15 percent of the ju-
rors were aware of this important fact.
To summarize, data from the Project reveals
that one of the primary influences upon jury
behavior in capital cases is the fear -- often
based on misunderstanding -- that a defendant
who does not receive a death sentence might
return to society in a relatively short time and
commit more crimes of violence.
This finding, which both Ted Eisenberg and
Bill Bowers have reported in recently pub-
lished articles, was cited by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the recent case of Simmons v. South
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Carolina where the Court held that it was a vi-
olation of a capital defendant's constitutional
rights for the trial judge to bar the jury from
receiving accurate information about alterna-
tives to a death sentence. Although the direct
effect of the decision in Simmons is limited to
South Carolina capital cases, Simmons holds
the promise that future Court decisions might
reduce the influence of the "future dangerous-
ness" factor upon juries.
Juror Responsibility for
The Defendant's Fate
Another issue that has emerged as crucial to
understanding the decision-making of capital
juries is the degree of responsibility that jurors
feel for the fate of the defendant. Based on my
interviews with jurors in Indiana, I can report
that in most cases, jurors began their sentenc-
ing deliberations by discussing -- often quite
emotionally -- whether they should have this
responsibility at all. One juror said, "The first
thing we did was everybody just collapsed lit-
erally in each others' arms and cried, knowing
that we had to do that .... Somebody just said,
'What right do we have to decide if somebody
should live or die?' And then we had a large
discussion about that, about whether we as
people had that right."
For obvious reasons, most average citizens
who are pressed into service as jurors in capi-
tal cases are extremely uncomfortable with the
responsibility of making a decision about
whether to put a defendant to death. Jurors
cope with these overwhelming feelings in a
variety of ways: some try to joke about the sit-
uation or otherwise distract themselves from
thinking about it; some pray in an attempt to
find guidance from a higher authority; and
some even turn to alcohol or other similar di-
versions, during the hours when they are not
required to be in the courtroom.
One of the most common reactions, howev-
er, is for jurors to look to "the law" for guid-
ance in making the sentencing decision. Even
though "the law" does not actually purport to
tell the jury what sentence to choose, many ju-
rors misinterpret the trial judge's legal instruc-
tions and manage to convince themselves that
"the law"dictates a certain sentencing result.
This apparently allows the jurors to avoid
feeling personally responsible for the sen-
tence. As one Indiana juror described the sen-
tencing decision, "I think it more or less was a
procedure. I had a feeling [the judge] was giv-
ing us a procedure and we needed to go
through these certain steps. And then if all the
pieces fit, then you have a responsibility to
come back with a death sentence."
Many of the jurors we interviewed managed
to avoid feeling personally responsible for the
sentencing decision -- despite the fact that the
trial judge directly instructed them that the
sentencing decision rested in their discretion.
The avoidance of personal responsibility is
even greater in those few states where the trial
judge has the legal authority to override the
jury's sentencing verdict; in these "judge over-
ride" states, the "individual juror" ranked last
in the jury's perception of responsibility for
the defendant's sentence.
At present, we cannot say whether capital
jurors reach better sentencing decisions when
they feel personally responsible for those de-
cisions. However, we can speculate that
avoidance of personal responsibility might
have the effect of making jurors more likely to
choose a death sentence; it may be easier for
jurors to live with the knowledge that a defen-
dant will be executed, based on their sentenc-
ing verdict, if they do not feel that they had
freedom to choose otherwise. If this specula-
tion is correct, then the findings of the Capital
Jury Project may establish a need for our legal
system to try to overcome this tendency
among capital jurors.8
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